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THE MORNING AFTER
This was the front page of the Tampa Morning Tribune the morning after the hectic City election of Sept. 3, 1935.
-Photo from- HAMPTON DUNN COLLECTION

TAMPA’S LONGEST DAY
Now It Can Be Told: The National Guard’s
Official Report on City Election, Sept. 3, 1935
By HAMPTON DUNN
Tampa has just gone through another
quadrennial Mayoralty election. This one was
a mild, patty-cake affair, compared with many
we had back in the pre-World War 11 days.
The hottest election of ’em all occurred on
Tuesday, Sept. 3, 1935, following a turbulent

Labor Day weekend and during one, of the
city’s most violent tropical storms.
And a "hot" election in that era meant just that
- "hot" votes, fraudulent registrations, stolen
ballot boxes, cannon manned by National
Guard troops, reckless display of machine
guns, sawed-off shotguns and a whole arsenal

of weapons by an army of special City Police
and special Sheriff’s deputies.
Showdown Clash
This was the showdown clash between two
political factions. The two camps were headed
by old pros-then incumbent Robert E. Lee
Chancey and Ex-Mayor D. B. McKay. There
had been a "warmup" contest four years
before, and tensions and bad feelings had
continued to build up as the battle for power
raged onward.
Election Day 1935-44 years ago-brought an
eyeball to eyeball confrontation of the City
and County adversaries. And it was a day in
which there was a display of naked, brute
force. All of which gave Tampa a bad name
throughout the nation.
It was the infamous day in history when this
city hit rock bottom. There was very little
good about those "good old days. "
Besides the Mayoralty candidates, the two top
characters in the day’s events were
Hillsborough County Sheriff Will C. Spencer
and Police Chief R. G. Tittsworth.
Troops Turned Out
And Gov. David Sholtz and State Adjutant
General Vivian Collins ordered out the
National Guard to keep order. Col. Homer W.
Hesterly was Commanding Officer of the
116th Field Artillery, with headquarters in
Tampa.
(By the way: When it was all over and the
smoke of battle had cleared and the winds of
the storm had calmed and the National Guard
troops went back to being civilians, it was
determined that Mayor Chancey had been
reelected by a margin of 4,241 votes.

COL. HOMER W. HESTERLY
‘... you kept your feet on the ground.'
-Photo from HAMPTON DUNN COLLECTION

(The mess triggered a cleanup movement by
the good citizens of the community.)
Here, for the first time, is published the
official narrative of the day’s happenings, as
recorded by Colonel Hesterly in his report to
General Collins. He wrote the report in the
same calm, cool and firm way, in which he
directed the troops during that crisis. The
report was made available to me by today’s
State Adjutant General, Maj.-Gen. K. C.
Bullard, whose headquarters is in St.
Augustine. General Bullard is a former
Tampan and served as Hillsborough County
Tax Collector prior to his appointment to the
Florida National Guard’s highest position. He’s
an alumnus of the 16th FA.

Colonel Hesterly’s Report
On with the story:
HEADQUARTERS

State Arsenal, Saint Augustine, Florida.
1. The following report covering the activities
of troops called into active state duty by letter
of the Adjutant General, Florida, dated
September 3, 1935, later confirmed by
paragraphs I and 2, Special Orders No. 209,
AGO. Florida, September 5, 1935, is
submitted:
2.

GOV. DAVID SHOLTZ
’I Am Proud . . . "
-STATE PHOTOGRAPHIC ARCHIVES

116TH FIELD ARTILLERY
FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD
TAMPA, FLORIDA
October 5, 1935.
SUBJECT: Report of Active State Duty.
TO: The Adjutant General, State of Florida,

Threatened
disorders
in
connection with the municipal
election of the city of Tampa
caused considerable alarm among
citizens and officials, resulting in
the sheriff of Hillsborough County
calling on the Governor for the
assistance of the National Guard.
The need for troops was
announced by the sheriff several
days in advance of the election and
the Adjutant General reached
Tampa the evening of 31 Aug. ’35,
to observe the situation and report
to the Governor as to the true state
of affairs.

3. Threats of disorder, inter-factional strife,
fraudulent election practices, ballot box
stuffing,
stealing
and
switching;
dissatisfaction on the part of many citizens
with the activities of the election officials;
rumored importation of hundreds of outside
gunmen as special officers, and many other
more subtle influences portended a trying day
for September 3, election day. The Adjutant
General conferred with many officials,
candidates, and citizens, besides the
Governor’s office; and, on September 2nd, the
order was issued for the mobilization of the
Tampa units of the National Guard to be held
in readiness at the Armory in Benjamin Field
for use in emergency, especially to quell
disorders.

4. The Guard was called to aid the "civil
authority", and a very interesting and, at times,
confusing situation arose in this connection.
There appeared to be, (and formal legal
opinion of attorneys conflicted on the point),
two overlapping bodies in power. The
"Election Board" of the City of Tampa is a
duly constituted body empowered by a special
act of the state legislature to conduct
municipal elections and said act attempted to
give full power to act, including the policing
of the elections. This police power in fact, if
not at law, overlaps the power of the sheriff,
the superior constitutional officer of the
county to enforce the law and maintain order.
The election board called on the city police
department under the chief of police, to
furnish the "police power" of the board. This
apparent overlapping of authority to police the
polls was the root of the trouble, which
resulted in the calling of the Guard. This
report takes no part of or interest in the
under-lying causes of this condition, nor the
other conditions which affected the participation of the Guard in the operations of the day.
The remarks immediately following are purely
expository and are set forth for the
information of the Guard and for its assistance
in possible subsequent similar developments.
Further, these facts are generally known to the
townspeople who are prone to shut their eyes
to the conditions, and hence the remarks
herein are merely expression of what is
common knowledge and not the expression of
any partisan party. The Guard must oftentimes
step into a situation where the real issue is
beclouded by conditions, and this makes its
position the most difficult and its activities
fraught with greater possibility of subsequent
adverse publicity and criticism- oftentimes by
the ones it is faithfully undertaking to serve.
6. Be the underlying factors what they
may: the election board, armed by
the chief of police and his force,
augmented by about 1154 special

police imported into the city for the
day, were interested in seeing that the
conduct of the election was in
accordance with the dictates of the
election board, and they were obviously supporting one group of
candidates. The sheriff’s department,
on the other hand, with an estimated
five hundred special deputies likewise
deputized for the day, was supporting
the other interests, and hence was
opposed to the city police force.
Ostensibly, the sheriff’s men were to
prevent irregularities in the election,
which, it was claimed, the underlings
of the election officials were interested in perpetrating in favor of
their candidate. This appeared to be
essentially the situation, and this is
the problem the Guard confronted.
Doubtless affidavits in any number
could be secured, defending both
sides. However, conflicting the
factors, the Guard had its work cut
out for it.
7. So the order read "called out in aid of the
civil authority": this is, or course, the sheriff.
The sheriff’s office was accusing the election
officials of every degree and brand of
irregularity and undertook to take steps to stop
or prevent these irregularities. The Guard was
called on to perform many duties which are
not within the province of the Guard under
existing orders; and careful consideration of
the many and varied demands made on the
military, was given, to determine just how far
the force of the State could be utilized.
Generally the Guard furnished the force while
the sheriff’s deputies armed with warrants
made arrests under the muzzles of the rifles
and pistols of the military. The Guard declined
to make arrests, take or hold prisoners, enter
polling places, handle election paraphernalia,
to vote in uniform, to police polling places
(the duty of the election officials), or, of

course, to take orders from any but proper
military sources or from the sheriff direct. It is
interesting to note that throughout the day a
constant stream of demands, some right
fantastic, came pouring into military
headquarters, compliance with which would
have been impossible in some cases, and in
others would have been entirely unsound from
a tactical standpoint and which would have
reduced the effectiveness of the armed forces
to the vanishing point.
8. The Adjutant General issued general
instructions while the details of operation
were, properly, left entirely up to the troops
commander, and it can be stated that the
troops commander received the fullest support
from the Adjutant General.
9. It is obvious from the foregoing that
the military establishment were
confronted with a very unusual
situation. There was no mob, no
rioting body, no threatened invasion,
no
anarchistic
demonstration.
Strange as it may seem, the National
Guard found itself supporting one
political body against another, both
ostensibly properly constituted and
duly empowered each to perform the
same job, but on opposite sides of
the political fence. Its job included
preserving order, and this involved
protecting
the
public
from
irresponsibles enlisted in either or
both factions; it involved supporting
the sheriff in making raids on
establishments where persons were
on whom warrants for arrest had
been issued; and this included a
number of precincts where the
precinct officials at the tables were
put under arrest. In some instances,
petty officials of the city were
involved. On top of that, the military
found later in the day that it would

have to decline to assist in certain
operations which, it was felt, fell
without the jurisdiction of National
Guard activity under its general
instruction.
10. It became apparent that there was a very
conflicting situation. It should be stated that
the actual conduct of the election was in no
sense within the scope of the military
operations. What went on around the polls
under authority of the election board and their
properly appointed officials, was not the
business of the Guard, and only when called
on by the sheriff to support his men in some
operation, raid, or arrest, did the Guard take a
hand itself. Many false rumors about
guardsmen "taking ballot boxes" and "entering
polling places with machine guns", etc., were
circulated. Orders on this class of activities
were clearcut and definite and well observed.
OPERATIONS.
11. The tactical employment of troops can be
definitely classified in several phases as the
day developed:
1.
Day before election. Mobilization at
8:30 P.M. 2 Sept. ’35.
2.
Prior to 9:00 A.M. Command held in
readiness at Armory 3 Sept. ’35.
3.
9:00
A.M.
to
2:00
P.M.
Reconnaissance and patrols. 3 Sept. ’35.
4.
2:00 P.M. 3 Sept. to 2:30 A.M. 4 Sept.
’35.
a. Strategical dispositions of force and
b. Support of sheriff’s deputies in raids
and arrests.
MOBILIZATION.
12. The order for mobilization was broadcast
from Station WDAE at 6:00 P.M. and
repeated at subsequent times. The customary
telephone system of spreading word was used

as well. By 8:30, the hour of mobilization,
approximately 60 percent of the command
was on the field in uniform. By midnight
approximately 90 percent were present for
duty. The strength for duty on September 3,
election day, for the post was as follows:
Strength Report, September 3, 1935
Organization: OFFICERS E M
AGGEGATE
Strength Present
Regtl staff
6
5
Staff 1st Bn 4
3
He. Bury & C in 1st Bn
3
3
Battery "A” 4
3
Battery "B” 4
4
Battery "C" 4
4
Med Dept Det
.3
3
Attached
2
2
30
27

Strength Present
0
0
0
0

Strength Present
6
5
4
3

36
67
68
65

34
64
62
60

39
71
72
69

37
67
66
64

22
1
259

22
1
243

25
3
289

25
3
270

ELECTION DAY OPERATIONS
13. An intelligence section in civilian clothes
began operation as soon as the order for
mobilization was given, and continued to
gather information and report it to the troops
commander until the troops were dismissed.
Prior to 9:00 A.M. Force in readiness.
a. Contrary to the special formations planned
for regular riot duty the batteries were held
intact, and were formed into squads within the
battery in accordance with the riot duty
formations, consisting of
Rifle squad,
Strong arm squad,
Machine gun squad (1 section)
each in command of an officer, the
captain commanding.
b. Gas detail from all batteries armed with
special equipment from state arsenal, was
assembled into on gas squad under a
lieutenant. This detail was held at the Armory
throughout the day ready for emergency
service in any part of the city.

Equipment consisted of three gas guns with
gas shells, gas grenades, gas masks, pistols.
c. Regimental Commander was in command.
d. Regimental staff formed into observation
patrols ready to move out on reconnaissance
as soon as need for troops should be in
prospect. The order "in readiness" required
holding troops at the Armory.
e. One officer, properly selected for
coolheadedness and understanding of law, was
placed in the sheriff’s office as coordinator
between the sheriff’s office and troops headquarters with special duties of securing from
the sheriff his instructions; and, for the
protection of the Guard, he secured, when
deemed advisable, signed orders covering the
demands of the sheriff.
14. 9:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M., September 3:
During the forenoon and through noon, and
after the order to take active part in the
support of the sheriff was received, the
dispositions were made with a view of
establishing contact patrols of negligible force
and of officers of sufficient experience to
prevent unwarranted, alarming reports and
preclude too hasty action in participating in
the anticipated disturbance. The regimental
executive was assigned a portion of the city,
the regimental plans and training officer a
portion, and the battalion commander with a
small force was dispatched to certain critical
points, such as particularly unruly precincts.
These patrols reported by phone at thirty
minute intervals, giving Headquarters and the
Regimental Commander a clear picture of the
situation and the sentiment as the election
wore on.
This set-up afforded several important
accomplishments:
a. Regimental Headquarters was
constantly advised of the situation

throughout the city as every polling
place was covered.
b. The presence of officers at the
precincts, in succession, had a very
quieting effect. It did not stop the irregularities
of
the
election
organizations but it dampened the
ardor of the irregulars, some of whom
were underworld characters and
ex-lawbreakers under arms on both
sides.
c. It afforded an excellent opportunity
to develop clearly a plan of action
when the troops were compelled to
take more definite action.
16. During this period, the sheriff
made no particular demands calling
for participation of the troops in any
workable tactical plan. He did insist
on having the troops parcelled out by
details to each precinct, 29 of
them-"to stop repeating and prevent
officials from stuffing ballot boxes"
and perform the duties of deputies.
This the commanding officer steadfastly declined to do. The correctness
of his decision in denying this
subdivision of his force was justified
in tactics, and particularly, in
subsequent developments. It is felt
important to stress the insistence
which the sheriff used in demanding
this division of force, and the
responsibility the commanding officer
necessarily took upon himself in
declining the request of his proper
source of orders, the sheriff. The
commander of troops necessarily
assumes that responsibility; he takes
the position that the sheriff could
request him to support the deputies,
but the method to be used is for the
troops commander to decide.

FORT HONORS HESTERLY
A WPA project in the late 1930s provided Tampa with
a first class military armory. It was named Fort Homer
W. Hesterly, commanding officer of the 116th Field
Artillery. He was in charge of troops, then operating
out of old Benjamin Field during that hot City election
in 1935.
-Photo by HAMPTON DUNN

The troops participating in this phase was
important, though not conspicuous.
17. 2:00 P.M., September 3 to 12:30 A.M.,
September 4: During the afternoon and night,
the principal activities of the troops took
place. As a matter of fact, the entire force,
except a small reserve, was out about the city
throughout the afternoon and right through the
worst of the hurricane. The operations in
general consisted in:
a. Strategical and tactical dispositions.
b. Active support of raids and arrests
by sheriff’s
deputies.
c. Guarding of polling places to
prevent disorders and irregularities
such as stealing, or
switching, of
ballot boxes.

It is notable that support was given the sheriff
in effecting several raids in which warrants for
the arrest of the precinct officials were served
and the officials removed from the polling
place; in three instances the deputies took the
ballot boxes also-as evidence. The election
officials complained bitterly about the
removal of the ballot boxes and in subsequent
raids the troops were compelled to prevent the
sheriff from taking the ballot boxes without a
court order, which, after investigation, was
decided by legal counsel to be necessary
before the Guard could properly assist the
sheriff in such an act. One of the most critical
situations of the day occurred at one precinct
where the deputies demanded the box as well
as the arrest of the officials, and when it was
refused, a very tense situation arose, near
midnight, into which the Guard stepped to
very good effect; the deputies got their
officials and the election board retained their
ballot box.
18. In any of the raids pulled resulting in
the arrest of the officials, the Guard
took no active part in the service of the
warrants leaving that entirely for the
deputies to do. The troops did not enter
a polling place, take any prisoners, or
interfere in any way with the legal procedure of the election. Without
exception, they merely supplied the
display of force under which the
deputies performed their duties.
19. The manner of performing the raids was
conventional. The troops would move into
position surrounding the object of the raid;
machine guns mounted on antiaircraft tripods
were set up in trucks and were stationed at
strategic points covering the windows and
openings of the establishment. Foot troops,
armed with rifle and bayonet and pistol and.
riot sticks, accompanied the deputies as

closely as deemed necessary, to give them
ample and certain protection. The deputies
entered the places and made the arrests, after
which the troops commander might detail an
armed convoy to accompany the deputies and
prisoners to the jail. The machine guns on
antiaircraft tripods are not particularly well
adapted to this service, in so far as the security
of the gun squad is concerned, as snipers
could very easily cripple the crew. The moral
effect, however, was most excellent. The
ability to sweep the surrounding area with fire
in all directions, to cover windows an
housetops against snipers-and, too, the very
daring of so mounting the guns, had a very
salutary effect.
All raids involving arrests were conducted in
essentially this manner.
20. The gas detachment was held at the
armory in reserve for an emergency where it
might be necessary to empty a building or
break up a concerted disturbance between the
henchmen of the two hostile factions. In the
disturbance at midnight, above referred to, it
appeared for some time as if the troops would
have to force an entrance to the polling place,
to assist the deputies in making arrests. In this
case the gas detail was dispatched there to
neutralize the force of some hundred-odd
special police housed in the polling place for
the purpose of repelling the attack of the
deputies. Strict orders had been issued by the
chief of police to allow no one to take the
ballot box at any cost. The Guard succeeded in
gaining the arrest of officials by the deputies,
and at the same time preserved the box for the
police, not having any authority from the court
to take the box.
21. At about three o’clock in the
afternoon of September 3, it had
become evident there
would be armed participation by the
majority of the troops. This was

particularly true in light of the fact
that we were to aid the sheriff in his
raids and arrests. It was impossible to
foretell what the reaction among the
large force of special police might be.
Hence it was decided to make a
strategic move and threaten the
"centers" of greatest tension and irregularity. These were on opposite
sides of the city but on the same
through street and scarcely more than
a mile apart. However, it made a very
nice disposition, together with the
other battery being used in a
succession of raids. A battery was
detailed to each of these points with
orders to make a show of force in the
vicinity of these particular polling
places; to report to the principal
deputy on duty, assist him in any
reasonable demands, locate immediately a telephone and contact
troops headquarters, leaving on duty
two men at the phone, and await
developments and orders.
22. It developed that the presence of these two
forces so advantageously disposed, also had a
very dampening effect on the irregulars of the
police department, and tended to calm the
situation over a wide territory.
23. Threats of impending clashes in other
sections and at troublesome precincts caused a
further disposition of force to cover closely a
wide territory. The two battery commanders
were directed to dispatch a fourth of their batteries to two additional precincts, each in
command of an officer with instructions to
immediately report to headquarters by phone,
establishing contact and detailing two men to
remain at the phone (telephone men and, of
course, a messenger); to report to the principal
deputy and assist him in any reasonable
mission, and keep in close telephone contact
with his battery commander.

24. We now had these several units in the field
in close communication:
a. One battery assisting deputies in a
succession of
raids.
b. Two batteries, less detachments,
covering “centers" of unrest.
c. Four platoon detachments stationed
at as many precincts and in close
communication with their battery
commanders.
d. Roving officer patrol observing and
reporting on
the territory not otherwise covered.
e. A reserve and a gas squad at the
Armory.
f. Command post and message center
at Headquarters (Armory).
g. Liaison officer in the sheriff's office.
h. The Adjutant General at his hotel in
touch with the State and leaders of
both factions, with the press and
public.
An organization chart as in force, is appended
showing the dispositions and chain of
command during the afternoon's activities.
25. A most notable feature is the extreme
mobility of the command with the trucks. The
batteries used their own equipment, which was
ample. The patrolling was done in
headquarters station wagons. No effort was
made to be secretive and boldness was the
custom. In a very few minutes' time, a battery
could be dispatched from one precinct to
another and, while the officer in command
was perfecting dispositions, a detail was
contacting head quarters and a new phone
number was noted on the diagrams at
headquarters. It was understood that instantly
a phone went out another would be resorted
to. In this man ner, a comparatively small
force covered a wide territory to the
discomfiture, it is safe to say, of the irregulars

who were causing such disturbance as went
on.
26. During the tour of duty a complete
message center was in operation at the
Armory. With our own equipment the
phone from the boxing arena was run
into the headquarters; the instrument
from the officer’s club was cut in on the
regular phone as an extension; and the
interphone system on the post made contact with the outside phone from
Regimental
Headquarters.
The
operations of the day were conducted in
an improvised office on the ground floor
where there was ample space for the
organization
to
operate
without
disturbing the regular headquarters of
the post. The message center made a
record of all incoming and outgoing
messages, particularly orders directing
troop movements, and a chart was kept
showing
the
pecinct
number,
detachment, officer in command, and
telephone number at all times. This was,
of course, changed as the day wore on
and orders were issued moving forces.
27. A map of the city was placed on a plane
table and pins with appropriate tickets showed
the dispositions at a glance.
One command telephone line was restricted to
the use o the Executive in receiving orders
from the sheriff’s office and in issuing orders
and contacting the moving forces This line
had an extension from the message center with
an instrument on the Executive’s desk so that
he could hear al incoming messages and so the
Sergeant Major could get without loss of time,
outgoing messages and record them in the
diary.
28. During the hours when it was in operation
in the heat of the activity of the afternoon and
early evening, the organization worked to

perfection; and one would have thought it had
been in operation indefinitely. Late in the day,
however, the telephones began to fail, and in
the midst of the storm the operations were
transferred to Post Headquarters where a
phone was still in operation. Fortunately, this
phone held on until 11:00 P.M. where all
phone communication went on. The midnight
operation above noted was handled through
couriers.
29. Coupled with the high mobility, the
morale and spirit of the men was superb. Not
only was the attendance phenomenal, but the
willingness of the command, officer and man
alike, to fare forth on this most uncomfortable
mission, facing criticism and discomfort as
well as the unbated fury of the tropical
hurricane, not to mention some hazard before
hundreds of unorganized and undisciplined
gunmen was a display that the Florida
National Guard may well be proud of and
upon which the State of Florida may rest with
full assurance of unquestioned and unflinching
service from her soldiers, in any emergency.
30. It is noteworthy that, after the troops took
active part in the operations of the day, not a
report of disturbance was recorded. Credit
must be given in this for the advent of the
terrific storm, which very effectively cooled
the ardor of the participants which, otherwise,
might have led to hilarity and trouble; and for
the fact that special police officers had been
instructed that the orders of the military force
were supreme.
31. Although there has been criticism from all
sides, it seems to be generally conceded that
the National Guard acquitted itself with
distinction. To use the words of Governor
Sholtz to the troop commander: "You men did
a good job, you kept your feet on the ground, I
am proud of your regiment".
(Signed) HOMER W. HESTERLY

Homer W. Hesterly,
Colonel, 116th Field Artillery,
Commanding.

A TRUE COPY
VIVIAN COLLINS, The Adjutant General, Florida.

